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رسالة الرئيس العراقي، صدام حسين

إلى الرئيس الإيراني، علي أكبر هاشمي رافسنجاني

في 19 مايو 1990

President Saddam Hussein's letter to Iranian Islamic

Revolution leader All Khamenei and Iranian President

Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani on 19 May 1990

Mr. Ali Khamenei,

Mr. Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani,

     I received your written letter dated 6 Shawwal 1410 Hegira (1 May 1990) in reply to our letter to you dated 26 Ramadan 1410 Hegira, corresponding to 21 April 1990. I and my brothers in the leadership read and re-read it several times. Although we understood from your letter that you agree to our proposal to hold a meeting between us at summit level in order to find a decisive and final solution to the outstanding problems between our countries which caused or resulted from the conflict, and we were pleased with that, the spirit of the letter itself was not as we had hoped. Because the letter contained cynical (mubattanah) terms at the beginning, and whenever there was an opportunity to use them, and harsh terms at the end.

      Gentlemen, when we thought of writing directly to you, we considered all aspects of our special relationship and found that direct correspondence and the relationship it establishes is more effective in achieving direct contact and dialogue and that there isn't a better and more beneficial and effective way to achieve the desired peace between Iraq and Iran, and in fact between the Arab nation and Iran. We know and assume that you also understand that peace between us cannot be achieved by one side only being convinced, while the other side is not equally convinced, or by one side only showing interest, while the other side does not show equal interest or share the same ideas, meanings, and methods.

      Before writing our first letter, we recalled that we have used the strongest and perhaps the harshest terms against each other during the past 10 years. And despite the effect of that method on the conflict and war between us, it did not achieve peace. Your letter included such terms as"the imposed war"and"slow understanding". You also Concluded your letter with the sentence"peace be upon those who heeded right guidance"(a term used by Prophet Muhammad in his messages to then Roman, Persian, and Abyssenian rulers asking them to convert to Islam) rather than the term"peace be upon you"which is normally used in such correspondence.

      Because we want peace -- only out of its great meanings to us and to our beliefs -- our message contains conceptions and expressions in harmony with our human understanding and noble objectives. Thus, we have only used expressions which please God and the people. To start with, using these expressions does not mean a change in all our conceptions and views; rather, it means that we desire to open a new chapter which is closer to the other party and more capable of affecting it in the interest of the approach of peace, which we deem as a noble objective of benefit to our people and to humanity at large. And because this method is the proper and suitable method for such objectives and means, duty mandates that we should try and use a new way of addressing each other, which is different from the way used during the war and the time before. Moreover, using the expressions and vocabulary which were used during the war should not lead either of the two parties to believe that an extra capability has been added to what is known to be possessed by the two parties of the dispute. Neither does this help to bear out a matter as right. Furthermore, using appropriate expressions for such address, in case it does not add to his power and assist him --- after depending on God-will not diminish any portion of its capability and will not diminish any established right, but would be a luminous path into the hearts which were burdened and gravely injured by war. This would help these hearts, in case they should opt for seeking the truth, and qualify them to do what is good for the sake of establishing peace.

     Therefore, we have found that what is appropriate for correspondence between us is that we should not confirm what we view as our right so that you might  not rush to confirm what you view as your right, and thus there might not be an opportunity for the required psychological readiness so as we both might accept direct dialogue. By saying this, we do not mean to close the door to dialogue, which would open through the direct connection of what we both view as useful; so that each one of us would know the connection between the first step and the last step on the road of peace; so as to be able to view the peace process as a whole right from its very beginning; and to see the connection of what one deems his right to that which the other views as his right.

     It is preferable that, as we pursue peace, neither of us should be preoccupied with the past at the expense of the future, because dwelling on the events of the past makes the one who does so in the eyes of our people -- who are more capable of knowing the traits of each one of us -- stand accused of being slow-witted. While saying this, we do not want to escape from the past, because you know, or can realize, that we are capable of presenting in the arena of debate about the inception of war and hostility and how it all began, sufficient documents which support our viewpoint in detail. You also know that documents are more effective in convincing the widest segment of our people and humanity at large than mere sayings and preconceptions of either of the two countries' leaderships.

     You are fully aware that the questions on and preoccupation with this issue, if deemed to be a prelude for our discussions, considering that this would have chronological significance as you used to say before July 1990. requires time and effort to support the argument -- a time period that will be as long as the war or longer than the war years. You are also well aware that each side to the conflict has its own story on when the conflict erupted. On this, each side bases its story on practical and legal facts different from the facts used by the other side. From this, it would become clear which party is entitled to describe the war as an imposed one and which party has the right to indicate that it sent messages rather than troops.

     As for UN Security Council Resolution 598. we have viewed it, since our acceptance of this resolution when it was issued in July 1987. as a comprehensive and durable peace plan containing what the two countries can agree upon. We have noted that the principles and Provisions contained in it would help us reach an agreement. That is why we have adhered and continue to adhere to the need to implement the resolution on the basis of this understanding. While pursuing peace, we base our positions on the equal desire of both countries for peace and their awareness of the benefits that they stand to draw from such peace. We also believe that they have the same enthusiasm for attaining this peace. Therefore, neither of the two sides to the conflict is asked to pay an advance price for the direct meeting. The only prerequisites are a serious desire for peace and the use of significant practical terminology. When peace is achieved, it is taken for granted that the army of each country will be on its own territory and that it will not have a presence on any hilltop or inch of territory or in the territorial waters of the other country -- the developments created by special circumstances and considerations relating to the cease-fire and the no war, no peace situation.

     You have said in your message that you withdrew from Iraqi territory and here you are referring to your withdrawal from Halabjah under special and well-known circumstances, to the end of the sentence.

     Our comment on this is that we withdrew from your lands which our armies entered under well-known circumstances at the outset of the armed conflict in 1980. This withdrawal took place on 20 June 1982 after we had announced the withdrawal decision in our news media on 10 June 1982. In this announcement, we said that we would withdraw within a maximum of 10 days. This was actually carried out. As for your troop withdrawal from Halabjah, it was carried out under special combat condition's which are different from the conditions under which our armies withdrew.

     Hence, if you consider your withdrawal from Halabjah, which was implemented under special circumstances, evidence of good faith showing that you do not covet anybody's territory, it would be a more powerful argument for us to say that our withdrawal from your lands in 1982 and after the fourth Tawakkalna ' Al-allah battles in the southern and central sectors in July 1988 were further evidence, to be added to other pieces of evidence, showing our good faith and the lack of a desire on Iraq's part to keep any inch of Iranian territory.

     Anyhow, we believe that peace means that no side should usurp any inalienable right of the other side. It also means that each side to the conflict should not keep any inch of the other side's territory or territorial waters. This is the policy which we have been reiterating and adhering to in the most precarious and hostile circumstances. Therefore, it is only natural that we will adhere to this policy at a time when we are urging you to adhere to it while conducting peace negotiations and to help achieve peace, God willing.

     From your reply to the inquiries our ambassador in Geneva presented to your ambassador there about what was cited in your letter to us on a preliminary meeting between representatives from both sides, we have learned that you prefer this method in preparing for a summit meeting. We agree to this arrangement and have authorized Barazan Ibrahim al-Tikriti, our ambassador in Geneva, to hold talks with Sirus Naseri, your ambassador there.

     We are of the opinion that the task of our two representatives is to exchange views on the positions of both sides so that each side can familiarize itself with the other side's position vis-a-vis the issues that are of concern to us. The two representatives might be able to agree on some points in a manner that will clarify the picture for us when we meet on the summit level. This may also facilitate our mission, provided that the points of disagreement are left for the summit meeting.

     As for the venue of the summit, we are still awaiting a definite answer from you because we did not find in your reply a decisive opinion about the venue we proposed, that is, holy Mecca. This might also be one of the topics to be discussed by the two representatives.

     As for who will attend the summit, we still believe that a summit meeting should comprise all basic decision-makers in the two countries, provided that you really accept the idea of a meeting on the summit level and, depending on God, seek to attain this aim together with us because the attendance of both of us on the summit level is a test of the seriousness of this trend to settle matters by final solutions acceptable to the two sides. If this, with God's help, is achieved, a lasting and comprehensive peace will prevail. Keeping the basic decisionmakers, who can say no or yes, outside the summit will affect the implementation of what is agreed on and influence the degree of commitment to it. Excluding them will not serve the purpose nor adequately reassure them and this might lead to obstructing or amending any decisions reached during the summit.

     Moreover, peace begins where its psychological beginning starts --inside those who weave its threads, so that it will remain constant in the heart. Therefore, the one who participates in making peace right from the beginning will find out that he is ethically and psychologically responsible for implementing and abiding by it. Moreover, the presence of all decisionmakers will dismiss any excuse that might complicate or delay the peace process after agreeing to it. Therefore, we reaffirm our proposal that the summit meeting be attended on our side by the chairman of the Revolution Command Council (RCC) and president of the republic and by the RCC vice chairman, and on the Iranian side by Mr. Ali Khamenei and Mr. Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. God stand witness to our good intention. Peace be upon you.

     Signed Saddam. Hussein, Baghdad 24 Shawwal 1410 Hegira, corresponding to 19 May 1990.

- FBIS-NES, 20 August 1990