humanitarian workers and provided a capacity to promote and supervise local withdrawals and other confidence-building arrangements

35. However, UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its safe-area mandate and particularly to deter deliberate attacks on the areas has been severely limited by the inherent deficiencies of the safe-area regime to which I have more than once drawn the Council's attention,  most recently in my report of 1 December 1994 (S/1994/1389), and by the military activities of the two sides. In recent weeks these difficulties have increased as relations have deteriorated between the parties and the safe areas have been drawn into the intensifying conflict throughout the country

36. It should be recalled that resolution 836 (1993) does not require the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to withdraw its military or paramilitary units from the safe areas. However, the Council has, in presidential statements, made it clear that "provocative actions by whomsoever committed" were unacceptable (S/PRST/ 1994/14 and 57). As I emphasized in document S/1994/1389, the party defending a safe area must comply with certain obligations if it is to achieve the primary objective of the safe area regime, that is, the protection of the civilian population. Unprovoked attacks launched from safe areas are inconsistent with the whole concept.

37. In recent months, government forces have considerably increased their military activity in and around most safe areas, and many of them, including Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihac, have been incorporated into the broader military campaigns of the government side. The headquarters and logistics installations of the Fifth Corps of the government army are  located in the town of Bihac and those of the Second Corps in the town of Tuzla. The Government also maintains a substantial number of troops in Srebrenica (in this case, in violation of a demilitarization agreement), Gorazde and Zepa, while Sarajevo is the location of the General Command of the government army and other military installations. There is also an ammunition factory in Gorazde.

38. The Bosnian Serb forces' reaction to offensives launched by the government army from safe areas has generally been to respond against military targets within those areas, often at a disproportionate level. Notwithstanding the provocation, these acts of the Bosnian Serb forces violate the safe-area regime and other local agreements. The Serbs have also initiated unprovoked shelling of safe areas. In both cases civilian casualties have occurred. UNPROFOR's mandate to deter attacks upon the safe areas requires it to react to Serb actions, irrespective of whether the Serbs are responding to offensives launched by the other side. When they are doing so, however, the impartiality of UNPROFOR becomes difficult to maintain and the Force is seen as a party to the conflict, with resulting risks to isolated United Nations personnel.

39. UNPROFOR's capacity to carry out its safe-area mandate has also been affected by the Bosnian Serbs' denial of freedom of movement to and from the three eastern safe areas (Gorazde, Srebrenica, Zepa), as a result of which resupply of UNPROFOR personnel by road has become virtually impossible.UNPROFOR's stocks of fuel in these three safe areas have recently fallen to dangerously low levels. If the Bosnian Serb side persists in blocking resupply convoys, the only way to resupply UNPROFOR personnel in these three areas would be by helicopter, which would involve considerable dangers and of which I would inform the Security Council.

40. As the inadequacy of UNPROFOR's current mandate as a means of ensuring tolerable conditions in the safe areas has become clearer, there has been increasing pressure on the

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