UNPROFOR a number of additional tasks related to the normalization of life in the city, as follows:

(a) To help the parties to achieve complete freedom of movement of people and goods to, from and within Sarajevo to remove any hindrance to such freedom of movement and to help to restore normal life to the city,

(b) Through the office of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo, to assist in the normalization of life.

44. Initially, UNPROFOR was able to take advantage of resolution 900 (1994) to mediate various agreements with the parties, notably on the opening of two routes across Sarajevo airport for civilian traffic and humanitarian goods. These routes were extensively used by both parties from March to July 1994 and from January to March 1995, during which times they contributed greatly to a relative normalization of life. UNPROFOR also mediated an anti-sniping agreement and, in March 1994, an agreement for the use of the routes across Mount Igman for civilian and humanitarian traffic.The Office of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo made considerable progress in 1994 in restoring utilities and other measures of normalization.

45. However, in recent weeks the significance of Sarajevo as a locus for pressure by the Bosnian Serb party on the Government and on the international community has again come to the fore. That party has closed the airport routes, has in effect closed the airport by refusing to guarantee the security of flights, has resumed shelling of the city, has fired on the Mount Igman road, has violated the anti-sniping agreement and has tightened its control on access to the Government-held areas. For its part, the Bosnian Government has also violated the anti-sniping and Mount Igman agreements, has used UNPROFOR as a shield for offensive and provocative activities and has increasingly applied restrictions on the Force's movement. Both sides have directly targeted UNPROFOR personnel, resulting in fatal casualties. This increased hostility and obstruction of UNPROFOR by both sides has seriously curtailed the Force's operational and logistic capability in the city.

46. If UNPROFOR were in a position unilaterally to reverse the situation in Sarajevo through, for example, reopening the routes across the airport and Mount Igman and forcibly removing the illegal Bosnian Serb checkpoint into the city, it would gladly do so. But, unless substantially reinforced and reconfigured into a combat force, it would not be able to keep the routes open. The same is true of Sarajevo airport. Without the cooperation and consent of the parties, a very large ground force would be required to enable UNPROFOR to ensure the security of the airport.

47. I remain convinced that the best way to achieve these objectives is for the parties to agree on the demilitarization of the city. My Special Representative has worked hard to attain this goal and has been encouraged by recent reaffirmations by Bosnian Government officials of their continued interest in it. Unfortunately, however, it is evident that there is at this time insufficient trust between the parties for even a step-by-step demilitarization process to begin.

J. Exclusion zones

48. Following the two grave incidents of shelling in Sarajevo in February 1994, I addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of NATO in which I requested him to obtain, at the earliest possible date, a decision by the North Atlantic Council to authorize the

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