Table II: ACCOUNTING FOR IRAQI TROOPS:
A ROUGH ESTIMATE OF ENEMY STRENGTH

         A change in any one number above must by definition change at least one other number because the total must come to 547,000.

         It is possible, however, that when 700,000 allied troops attacked on the ground February 23, they faced only 183,000 Iraqis - thus outnumbering the enemy 5 - 1. That 183,000 is the sum of the 63,000 soldiers the coalition captured plus the 120,000 Iraqi troops extrapolated to have escaped from the KTO after the war.

         The number of Iraqis deployed at the start of the ground war could be higher than 183,000 if Iraqi divisions were closer to full strength than this calculation gives them credit for, or if desertions were fewer. The number could easily be lower, however, for example, desertions were greater than the surprisingly low figure shown above as having perished in the air war.

         At this juncture, substantially more factual data are needed -- factual data that may lie in the captured documents. But for the present, the above represent the best figures; although the range in each category is substantial, the senior officers who provided them represent one-eighth of all the Iraqi forces in the KTO a good sample. Most important, however, whatever estimates are made in the future should take into account all seven categories listed above and not treat any one in isolation.

THE NEW BATTLEFIELD BALANCE

New Thinking About Tooth to Tail

         High technology has not only irrevocably changed the results of warfare, it has changed the process. Night vision makes around - the - clock warfare possible. In Operation Desert Storm, there was virtually no let-up after the first shot was fired.

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