As such, these changes in warmaking placed enormous pressure on the logistics system. What might have been a sufficient support system for a slower - paced, shorter war was strained in many places during the furiously - paced Gulf war. It is clear that the old " tooth - to - tail " relationship between support systems and combat systems needs careful review.

         One strain on the logistics system was caused by a simple lack of certain resources. For example, insufficient numbers of trucks and transports often became an operational bottleneck - not the combat equipment they supported. There was a dire shortage of Heavy Equipment Transport trucks ( HETs ) used for moving tracked vehicles over long distances, a problem solved only after a worldwide borrowing and leasing effort was undertaken. The number of all - terrain trucks like the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck ( HEMTT ) was also inadequate.

         In the air, the number of aerial tankers, not bombers or fighters, constrained the number of daily strike sorties. Successful strike operations also depended on aerial tankers. Tankers were crucial to all facets of air operations, and they extended the reach of practically every tactical aircraft employed.

         Another strain on the logistics system was equally basic: certain key support systems lacked the capability required for their missions. Engineering equipment for mineclearing and breaching, armored vehicle recovery, command and control vehicles, and medical evacuation assets were unable to perform as expected. In particular, the M - 548 ammunition carrier vehicle was severely criticized by a number of Army units as a " turtle that weighed too much, traveled about 5 miles per hour, could not maneuver in the sand, broke down all the time and held up troop movement ". One artillery officer said, "We need to get rid of it. Drive a stake through its heart. It can only carry half the required ammunition load and cannot keep up. During the war it was a pacing factor in our movements and other times we just left it behind".

         Former Joint Staff Director of Operations Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly succinctly illustrated the importance of competent support during testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in April 1991. He said, "I used to work in priorities. At some point, a fliel truck became more important than the tank it supported because it is no good to have the tank if you did not have the fuel for it".

Complexity of Warfare Requires Sophisticated Support

         Another change in warmaking brought about by high tech is the increasingly sophisticated nature of weapons and tactics. Adequate support for complex warfare starts with enough trucks, transporters and tankers, but requires more than that. The character of a high - tech military campaign requires reliable intelligence systems, direct combat support and intelligence feedback.

         Operation Desert Storm revealed significant problems in intelligence support. Tactical intelligence, in particular, quickly proved to be a serious flaw in the support chain. The first three days of air operations, having benefitted from months of careful planning and preparation, included full sets of target intelligence. After that, however, target imagery and current intelligence on mission performance decreased dramatically.

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