What arrived was often late, unsatisfactory or unusable. One wing intelligence officer said, "There were actual times when we sent guys out with no imagery at all. They only got a map and coordinates to find a target at night. We did continue to get targeting materials, but the coverage was spotty and almost always dated. We put in our requests, but they got swallowed by a black hole. Of the over 1,000 missions flown by ( one of the squadrons ), we only got back four imagery responses, and all four were of such poor quality that we couldn't even read the date to check ( their ) currency".

         The failure of the intelligence system to keep warfighters properly supplied with information underscores the vast increase in tailored, current intelligence required by weapons with one - target, one - bomb accuracy. By comparison, hitting single targets since World War II through Vietnam required at least hundreds of bombs and several sorties.

         The need for intelligence will continue to grow as next generation weapons enter the inventory. And as the sophistication of weapons increases, deficiencies in intelligence support will proportionally constrain their effectiveness.

         The capabilities of direct combat support systems were also inconsistent with the complex nature of modern warfare. Jammers, for example, have consistently lost in the scramble for dollars and, as a result, are aging and in short supply. These limitations constrain the ability of U.S. forces to put ordnance on target.

         For instance, most of the dedicated Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses ( SEAD ) platforms used in the war -- such as the EF - 111, F - 4G,and EA - 6B -- are old. Some were in the process of being phased out of service when Iraq invaded Kuwait. It required virtually all of these aircraft to support just 25 percent of the combat inventory.

         The success of the F - 117 stealth fighter does not negate the need for maintaining a healthy electronic jamming and SEAD support capability in current and future inventories. F - 117s did operate infrequently with dedicated electronic jammers, completely confusing and overwhelming Baghdad's dense air defense system. Furthermore, because the United States will not have an exclusively stealthy attack aircraft fleet at any point in the foreseeable future, the need for a strong jamming and defense suppression capability remains.

         The provision of intelligence feedback or "bomb damage assessment" ( BDA ) also proved deficient during the war. One reason was the shortage of tactical reconnaissance capabilities. For example, the Air Force RF - 4C reconnaissance aircraft were being eliminated from the force structure when Operation Desert Storm began, and Marine RF - 4C units had already been completely disbanded.

         An officer attached to an F - 15E Strike Eagle wing described the result of inadequate BDA:

         We deployed a system ( F - 15E ) that was still very immature. Good BDA was needed to let us know if the airplane was performing or not. The F-15E had never dropped many of the munitions that we used in the initial few days, so we had no real idea what we were doing. Our guys were eager to make the necessary adjustments in tactics, but they needed some indication

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