of what results we were getting. But no one seemed to listen, and it took us a long time before we figured out how to best employ the system. I ended up getting more information and more specific mission results from listening to radio broadcasts from the BBC than what I got through CENTAF channels.

          The greater degree of interdependence between combat and support suggests the need for a revised method of evaluating service priorities. What has emerged as an important lesson from Operation Desert Storm is that acquiring support Systems consistent with high - tech weapons may be more important than buying the next generation plane or tank.

Striving for a Balanced Military

          Another way of considering the relationship between weapon systems and support systems is balance. An examination of combat support revealed an imbalance between it and our combat capabilities. It was not uncommon for weapon systems to race far ahead of their support.

          In this new era of high tech, the mosaic of systems and capabilities that form military power requires a new degree of calibration and balance to consistently deliver maximum results. There must be a balance between weapons and support systems. There must also be balance among the capabilities of similar weapon systems. If there is not, the result will be an imbalance between the demands of modern warfare and the ability of our sophisticated weapon systems to satisfy them.

          General Kelly acknowledged the importance of this problem during his April testimony. He said, " Any force that I know of historically that lets itself get out of balance flirts with disaster. Defining what the balance is, of course, is the art and is the hard part ".

Balance in the Force Structure

          Operation Desert Storm also raised questions about balance within any given force structure. One example is the current and projected mix of combat aircraft in the U.S. inventory. In executing the air war, U.S. planners faced no shortage of overall air assets. However, Looking beyond the aggregate numbers reveals shortages of the most useful combat aircraft and an abundance of the least useful.

          Aircraft such as F - 117s, F - 111Fs, F - l5Es, A - 6s, tankers, SEAD and reconnaissance aircraft were invaluable, yet none of these aircraft is still in production. Some even face retirement with no viable replacement on the immediate horizon.

          On the other hand, the F - 16 and the F / A - 18 were available in large numbers but their limited range and limited night capability reduced their ability to play an interdiction role. Due to the particular nature of this air war, there was little air - to - air combat, for which the F - 16 and F / A - 18 are best suited.

          Furthermore, the limited numbers of the Low Altitude Navigation Targeting Infrared for Night ( LANTIRN ) pods deprived F - 16s of the means to deliver precision

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