munitions. F-15E aircraft also needed LANTIRN for precision delivery. Priority for fielding the small quantities of pods went to the F - 15Es because of their range and payload capabilities.

Balance Within Weapon Systems

         Another imbalance exists between the capabilities of similar weapon systems in different services. Fielding weapon systems that lack similar capabilities because of different subsystems makes it very difficult to integrate disparate, multiservice assets into effective combat operations.

         For instance, under the established rules of engagement, the F - 14, the F / A - 18, and the F - 16 could not positively identify enemy targets beyond visual range, hampering their usefulness. Only the Air Force F - 15 had the capabilities required under the rules of engagement to use air - to - air missiles beyond visual range.

         A Marine pilot said, "We need to start buying airplanes more like the Air Force, with the full set of gear. Instead, we buy Cadillacs with roll - up windows, like the F / A - 18 with unsatisfactory radar warning receivers, expendables [ e.g., chaff and flares ] and [ missile and bomb ] racks. I would give up I of the 12 aircraft in my squadron in order to fully equip the other 11".

         Unlike the Army and Air Force, Marine ground and aviation units had little or no night fighting capability, which forced them to virtually cease offensive action with the onset of dusk every day.

         One of the most urgent imbalances between weapon system capabilities and the requirements of high-tech warfare is inadequate means of distinguishing enemy from friendly forces. The identification measures used during ground operations such as the inverted " V " markings, reflective tape and other indicators combined with permissive fire arrangements failed to provide an adequate level of protection against friendly fire. This problem directly contributed to the coalition casualties caused by friendly fire.

         The lethality and range of air - to - ground attack aircraft and antiarmor weapons has dramatically increased over time, but the ability to discriminate among targets in a crowded battlefield has not kept pace. Unless more reliable positive identification measures are developed and fielded, the friendly fire problem will grow to the point where it will seriously constrain the ability to employ the full range of capabilities found in current and future weapon systems.

         With the notable exception of the friendly fire problem, most imbalances in Operation Desert Storm were addressed by applying brute force. The vast quantities of equipment, personnel and other resources available in Operation Desert Storm made this method of problem solving possible.

         However, the option will not be available much longer. Declining defense budgets and a shrinking force structure will limit our ability to buy our way out of problems. What is now required is more balance in our forces and systems to prevent the problems identified here from constraining us on future battlefields.

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