GOLDWATER - NICHOLS PLAYED A CRUCIAL ROLE

         Operation Desert Storm was the first major test of the Goldwater - Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. By most accounts, it passed with flying colors.

         Reflecting on the importance of this legislation for the conduct of the Persian Gulf war, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney said:

         I am personally persuaded that [ Goldwater - Nichols ] was the most far reaching piece of legislation affecting the Department since the original National Security Act of 1947.... Clearly, it made a major contribution to our recent military successes.

Goldwater Nichols-Fosters Jointness

         In past conflicts, each military service ran its own operation, sometimes without the benefit of much centralized control. The Goldwater - Nichols Act sought to foster joint military approaches to warfare by increasing the power of the Joint Combatant Commanders - in - Chief ( CINCs ), streamlining their chain of command to the President and strengthening the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

         Goldwater - Nichols gave the CINCs authorities commensurate with the long held responsibility for the conduct of a war. Most of the added authorities, such as command, employment of forces, and hiring and firing of subordinates were exercised by General Schwarzkopf in the Persian Gulf war. It also gave the CINC significant authority over logistics and support.

Unity of Command Was Key

         The most identifiable feature was the streamlined chain of command from Washington to the field commander. General Schwarzkopf, not the Joint Chiefs of Staff, controlled operations in the theater. The theater commander also was in complete control over combat forces.

         Because of the single chain of command, there was little opportunity to revisit decisions endlessly, as is the usual Pentagon practice. Goldwater - Nichols did not terminate interservice disagreements -- it made their resolution possible. For example, the CINC made the decision not to conduct an amphibious landing contrary to the strongly held views of some subordinate Marine commanders. This would have been a difficult decision to make stick prior to Goldwater - Nichols.

         In a marked departure from the past, the CINC also exercised overall control of logistics support in his theater of operations and of deployment priorities for bringing troops and equipment into the theater. General H. T. Johnson, commander of the Transportation Command, said that his command had many requests to ship weapons and equipment throughout the buildup and during the conflict. He told his staff, "Go to the unified command. If it is a requirement, and if it is a priority, we will move it. And that's the only way we get this to move".

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