How Would the AVF Fight?

         One question that Operations Desert Shield / Desert Storm asked and answered was, " How well can this force fight a war? "

         The force proved to be highly motivated. The morale indicators for the force in Southwest Asia were better than in the United States. Sick call and hospitalization rates were less than half of peacetime levels; accident rates were less than half those in a comparable U.S. experience, namely at the National Training Center. A House Armed Service Committee delegation in November 1990 reported that the farther forward it moved and " the harsher the conditions, the better...morale ".

         The force proved to be adaptive. The harsh environment of Southwest Asia challenged the AVF. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in late January 1991, service representatives cited the operational innovations by resourceful people in the field as a major reason for achieving equipment readiness rates above peacetime standards.

         Support units modified organizations and procedures to meet the challenges posed by the vast distances and rapid buildup and got the job done. The 101st Division, which deployed under - strength and received some fill - in, credited the quality of the individual soldier and his educational level for their quick infusion into the air assault units.

But Is It Fair?

         The war also raised anew the questions of representation of minorities and the poor in the AVF whether, in fact, it was fair.

         Black Americans of recruitment age comprise about 14 percent of the population as a whole, but 26 percent of new Army recruits and about 18 percent of new Marine Corps recruits. Overall, blacks comprise 31 percent of enlisted Army soldiers and 21 percent of enlisted Marines, compared to 12 percent of the general population aged 18 to 24. It is this disproportionate representation which gave rise to concerns of disproportionate risk for blacks.

         This question was treated in a report issued separately on April 26, 1991¹. The report examined three scenarios for armed conflict, and estimated the proportion of black service members at risk. In conflicts involving chiefly air power, or air power and Navy ships, blacks were underrepresented compared to their proportion of the population as a whole. In a ground war, blacks were somewhat overrepresented.

         In a war of the type fought against Iraq for the liberation of Kuwait, the report found that blacks would comprise 18 to 19 percent of the combat force. These figures are lower than the figures for black representation among enlisted service members for two reasons. First, blacks are underrepresented among Air Force and Navy pilots compared to their proportion of the total population. Second, blacks are not so disproportionately

1 Aspin, Les. All Volunteer: A Fair System, A quality Force. House Armed Services Committee 1991. Washington, D.C.

<40>