How this mobilization was carried out, how the reserve components performed and what lessons might be learned for the future are the subjects of this portion of the inquiry.

Planning for World War III

         Pre - war planning for reserve component mobilization -- particularly in the Army -- focused on a general war with the Soviet Union, triggered by a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO. The military planning envisioned a quick political decision to transition to full U.S. mobilization.

         Mobilization planning did not envision the way in which guard and reserve personnel were to be mobilized following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990.

Mobilization -- In Pieces by Improvisation

         Following the invasion of Kuwait, the services began preparing for action in Southwest Asia without knowing when -- or whether -- they would be able to call up the guard and reserve. As a result, they relied on active-duty forces and volunteers from the reserve components in developing their early responses, while laying plans to use the reserve components whenever they became available.

         On August 22, 1990, the President invoked section 673b of Title 10 of the United States Code, stating that " it is necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United States for an effective conduct of operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula ". This permitted calling to active duty as many as 200,000 selected reservists.

         However, the authority that Secretary Cheney gave to the services on August 23, 1990 was for 48,800-- not 200,000- and it had a number of restrictions.

• Active - duty service was limited to a total of 180 days.
• Access to individual replacements -- vital to filling critical skills in mobilizing units -- as limited to volunteers because section 673b permits no access to the Individual Ready reserve ( IRR ). The IRR remained unavailable until January 17, 1991, when Operation Desert Storm began.

          These initial call - up limits reflected the caution of the President and his advisers about tapping the reserve components, particularly combat units.

         The specific units called up id deployed reflected General Schwarzkopf's priorities for Southwest Asia. Those priorities were:

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