The Shift to an Offensive Option

          In September 1990, members of Congress urged a call - up of reserve component combat units to fully test the Total Force policy. To remove an impediment to the call - up of these combat units, Congress extended the duration of their call - up to a total of 360 days. This extension became law on November 5, 1990.

          On November 8, 1990, the President announced a force buildup in Southwest Asia to provide an offensive option to force Iraq out of Kuwait. The buildup would have two main elements -- more reserve component forces and more heavy forces drawn from active - duty units in Europe.

          Secretary Cheney expanded his earlier reserve component call - up authority on November 14, and again on December 1, 1990, to a total of 188,000 people:

Thus, the stage was finally set for the test of the Total Force policy.

ARMY

          Total Force policy finds its largest expression in the Army, whose 750,000 guard and reserve members provide about 50 percent of its total combat power, about 60 percent of its combat support and about 70 percent of its combat service support.

The Mobilization

          In response to the invasion of Kuwait, the Army ultimately activated over 145,000 guard and reserve personnel, or about 20 percent of the available force.

          These personnel performed with distinction and proved critical to Army success in the war with Iraq. The mobilization was not without its difficulties, however.

          These difficulties had their origins in a number of factors, including the piecemeal call - up authorization, the special demands of Southwest Asia, the need to improvise in the absence of appropriate planning, the pervasive prewar focus on a European scenario, and readiness problems with the units themselves.

          The mobilization eventually comprised 145,000 persons:

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