• The majority provided combat service support functions including transportation, medical, postal, water purification, civil affairs, finance and maintenance.
• Some provided combat support functions including engineers, aviation, chemical defense and decontamination and artillery ( designated as support because they were intended for division - and corps - level support ).
• 16,000 provided combat capabilities, specifically the National Guard roundout brigades and battalions.
• About 75,000 guard and reserve people were in Southwest Asia at the peak of the war, about 25 percent of the Army in-theater strength. About 75 percent of those deployed provided combat service support and 25 percent provided combat support.
• Less than 10 percent of the guard and reserve people were deployed to Europe to provide support functions.
• Most of the remaining guard and reservists were deployed at locations in the United States, either to provide support functions or to train for deployment to Southwest Asia.

          In addition to these totals, there were about 14,000 Individual Ready Reservists that the Army was able to activate after January 17, 1991 to fill critical slots. The totals include a few thousand early volunteers that the Army had put on active duty in combat service support roles.

Evolution of the Call - Up

          The Army tailored its use of reserve components to meet the military requirements in Southwest Asia. The Army view of the role of the guard and reserves changed over time. These changes reflected both the constraints on the Army's call - up authority and the changing situation in the theater and in Washington:

• In the first weeks of August, the Army began planning an 88,000 - person call - up of combat and support units tailored to the crisis. To meet the immediate needs of the theater for support for the early arriving Army combat units, the Army committed a large part of its available active - duty combat service support units.
• On August 23, 1990, the Army only received authorization for 25,000 personnel in support units, rather than 88,000 personnel including combat units. The Army responded by mobilizing only those units needed quickly by General Schwarzkopf.
• The differences between the host nation support and infrastructure available in Southwest Asia, and what was assumed available in pre - war planning for a European crisis, led to unexpected differences in the types of units deployed. Thus:
• Support units that would have been late deploying in a European war ( e.g., water purification, postal ) were forced to be early deploying to Southwest Asia, regardless of their readiness.
• Units that expected to be early mobilizing, such as the guard roundout combat brigades that were part of early deploying active divisions, could not be used because of the Administration's interpretation of its limited mobilization authority and higher priority in theater.

<44>