This chain of events had two results:

• It ruptured Capstone and Roundout, two long-standing programs that were the Army's principal mechanism for integrating the active-duty personnel and reserves into cohesive wartime commands.
• It negated reserve component expectations -- particularly, but not exclusively, in the combat units that the Army's active and reserve forces would go to war together.

         Capstone identifies the active - duty units with which reserve units will be associated in wartime, and establishes a formal peacetime relationship between them that includes joint planning and exercises.

         Roundout does essentially the same thing, but National Guard Roundout brigades and battalions are not merely associated with their active units. They are intended to make whole or roundout those active units to their full strength.

         It is against the backdrop of expectations and relationships created by these two programs and their associated planning that the mobilization of Army reserve components took place.

         Some reserve component units that anticipated early call - up were not called at all. One such unit was the Army National Guard artillery brigade from South Carolina that is operationally aligned with the early deploying XVIII Airborne Corps. This unit was told by its active force counterpart to expect to be in Southwest Asia by September. Preparations were begun at cost to the personal and civilian professional lives of brigade members, yet the final call never came.

         The commander of the Second Army, an Army element that mobilized nearly 50,000 reservists and guardsmen, called the inability to capitalize on programs such as Capstone one of the bad news stories of the war. As reported to the committee by both active and reserve commanders, the Army paid a price for discarding Roundout and Capstone because it:

• Increased the effort required to determine the post-mobilization readiness of reserve units and increased the inefficiency of the process. For example, reserve units frequently had to repeat training or administrative measures already accomplished at home station in order to prove their readiness to people unfamiliar with their unit.
• Created numerous instances where reserve component units perceived themselves to be second-class citizens in the view of active units that had never trained or worked with the reserve unit.
• Extended by 30 to 60 days the time required for reserve units thrust into new organizations in Southwest Asia to become fully integrated with the operational and tactical procedures of the new unit.

         In November 1990, the Army view of the guard and reserve role evolved again with the extension of active - duty service to a total of 360 days and the President's decision to prepare for an offensive. With the increase in call - up authority to 80,000 on November 14, 1990 and then to 115,000 on December 1, 1990, the guard and reserves were now used in four roles:

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