Overall Impact of Army Guard and Reserve

          In summary, the reserve components played a key role in supporting the Army's combat forces during Operations Desert Shield / Desert Storm.

          Deficiencies in the pre-war readiness of the Army's combat service support and combat support units made the mobilization process longer and more difficult than expected. Despite these difficulties, these support units were made ready and performed with skill and effectiveness.

MARINE CORPS

          The Marine Corps has structured its 40,000 selected reservists as a separate division consisting of the 4th Marine Division ( with 50 percent of the reservists ), the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing ( with 25 percent ) and the 4th Force Service Support Group ( with 25 percent). In wartime, these units would augment or reinforce the three active - duty divisions, or provide a fourth division.

The Mobilization

          The Marine Corps activated and deployed to Southwest Asia a larger percent of its available selected reserves than any other service.

• The Marine Corps activated about 30,000 selected reservists ( about 75 percent of the available force ). This included almost all of the combat units in the Marine 4th Division ( infantry and armored units ) as well as field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, aviation, intelligence and reconnaissance, combat engineering, and support units.
• About 15,000 selected reservists were in Southwest Asia at the peak of the war, representing about 17 percent of the Marine Corps in - theater strength. These units included an infantry regimental headquarters, four infantry battalions, one - plus tank battalions, six artillery batteries, and five aircraft squadrons.
• Several thousand reservists were deployed to replace active - duty combat and support units that had deployed to Southwest Asia from the Pacific and to participate in a major training exercise in the Atlantic.
• After Operation Desert Storm began, the Marines activated almost 7,000 Individual Ready Reservists ( almost 20 percent of the force ) to provide replacements for anticipated casualties. None were deployed to Southwest Asia.

How the Marine Mobilization Evolved

          In August 1990, the Marine view reflected their pre - war mobilization planning. It envisioned active forces able to sustain themselves for the first 60 days of a crisis. Because the reserves had no early role ( and possibly no role at all ), no reserve units were called up.

          In October 1990, when the first reserve units were being called up, the reserves were used to provide replacements for active support units sent to Southwest Asia from other theaters and to supplement the rotation base.

<49>