In a few cases, the Marine Corps took extraordinary measures to overcome known deficiencies in its reserve combat forces, like re - equipping two reserve tank companies and having the Army train them in the use of the M - 1 tank prior to deployment.

          However, at least 5 of the 20 company - sized units noted as having some training weaknesses were eventually employed in combat and continued to exist at the company and battery level -- particularly in the case of the non - infantry arms such as armor and artillery.

          The reserve combat units deploying to Southwest Asia underwent a 30 - day pre deployment training period at Camp under the guidance of the 2nd Marine Division. As the Army found during its mobilization station processing of combat support and service support units, the press of time and other constraints limited what the Marine Corps could do to correct training shortcomings, or to overcome the systemic reserve component weakness in battalion - level command and control, even though unit commanders could tailor training to unit deficiencies.

Critical training limitations included:

• A lack of training equipment to replace that previously shipped to Southwest Asia.
• Too little time to train individuals in their military occupational specialties.
• Little tank gunnery or artillery live fire.
• Little company or battalion maneuver training.

          In general, the Marine Corps found, as did the Army, that the mobilization station was not an efficient place to train units to acquire basic combat skills.

In - Theater Training

          Once in theater, all reserve combat units were fully integrated into active units and continued to train, with an emphasis on preparing for specific missions, for example, breaching operations.

          The training that enabled units to overcome pre - deployment weaknesses remained constrained by several factors:

• Reserve tank companies who were weak in gunnery skills found it difficult to improve because their live fire was limited to fixed - position, short - range firing at static targets and training ammunition was limited.
• Artillery ammunition was constrained.
• Due to their late arrival in Southwest Asia, the five reserve combat battalions were given limited time to practice battalion - level maneuver training.
• Equipment related problems, out of the control of reserve combat units, cut into the time they could spend training and so hindered their preparation for Operation Desert Storm.
• Some pre-positioned equipment was inoperable ( e.g., oil and transmission fluid seals rotted so turrets and main guns were inoperable, batteries died and tires rotted so vehicles were inoperable ).

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