Throughout the period of Operation Desert Shield, a continuous dialogue took place among the CENTAF planners, the Air Staff's " Checkmate " planning cell and the Navy's " Spear " intelligence group as the process of identifying strategic targets continued and the plan evolved. Important details of the final plan were not decided for several months. By the time the air campaign began on January 17, 1991, the plan had grown to include 386 separate targets and would ultimately grow to 723 targets.

          One issue that arose during the planning of the air campaign was whether or not the use of air power alone could achieve U.S. military and political objectives in the Gulf. Instant thunder ( as this air - only plan was called ) was not executed, however, because senior military planners and DOD officials believed that an air - only option could not guarantee the withdrawal of the Iraqi army from Kuwait.

Planned Air Campaign Had Four Phases

          CENTCOM's air campaign plan for Operation Desert Storm was composed of four phases. The first, or strategic phase, was intended to destroy Iraq's integrated air defense system, gain air superiority over the Iraqi air force, destroy Iraq's strategic offensive capabilities ( nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and production facilities and SCUD tactical ballistic missiles, launchers, and production capabilities ), and disrupt Iraqi command, control and communications to its armed forces.

          Phase II was intended to suppress Iraqi air defenses in the KTO to provide freedom of action for Phase III attacks against Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guards in the KTO. The Phase III attacks were meant to isolate the Iraqi army in the KTO, cut it off from its source of resupply and reinforcements, and then reduce it to the level that a ground campaign could be conducted with minimal casualties. Phase IV provided air support to the ground offensive.

Planning for the Ground Offensive

          Planning for the ground offensive campaign began almost immediately after the Iraqi invasion and was done on a close - hold, compartmented basis by small planning cells in both CENTCOM and the Pentagon. For about three months, knowledge of the planning was limited to a handful of senior officials.

          In early October, the CENTCOM ground plan called for penetration of Iraqi defenses in Kuwait and a relatively shallow envelopment to the west to trap Iraqi forces. Although the exact numbers of Iraqi troops were unknown, their strength steadily increased throughout the fall and their defenses extended farther and farther west.

          CENTCOM recognized that conducting a shallow envelopment with the number of allied forces in theater and against the ever - stronger Iraqi forces had problems. The available U.S. and allied ground forces restricted the scope of a ground attack to a fairly direct drive into Iraqi defenses. However, CENTCOM believed it was the only executable ground campaign with the forces on hand. A wider envelopment would have caused the attacking force to be split, leaving both elements dangerously exposed to

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